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lN THE SUPREME COURT
1

of the

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent
- vs. -

Case No.
10653

C. W. BRADY, JR.,
Defendant arnd Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Thjs is a criminal action initiated by indictment
charging defendant with 1st degree perjury.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant was convicted by a petit jury. The judgment of conviction was after denial of a motion for a
new trial.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks to reverse the judgment of
conviction and the dismissal of the action.

STATEMENT OF F.&OTS
The indictment (R. 1-3) accuses the defendant of
having testified falsely on the 7th day of May, 1965
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before the Honorable l\fauric0 D. Jones, Judge of thP
City Court, Salt Lake City. The indictment is set forth
in Schedule A of the appendices. The bracketed portions as shown on Schedule A are our own markings,
with the letters in the left-hand margin corresponding
with the same lettered subparagraphs of paragraph 2 of
the Instruction No. 6 (R. 68-71), which instruction is
set forth in full in Schedule B of the appendices.
During the year 1963 and the portion of the year
1964 covered by Judge Jones in his questioning of the
defendant Mr. Brady was Chairman of the Salt Lake
County Board of Commissioners, in charge of Roads
and Bridges, Sanitation and Flood Control. At the time
of his deposition on May 7, 1965, Mr. Brady was Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Utah. The
Grand Jury for Salt Lake County was convened in
July of 1965.
The bill of particulars ( R. 12-14) as furnished by
the District Attorney attempts to delineate the subject
of inquiry before Judge Jones. The copy of complaint
attached to the bill of particulars (R. 15) is referred
to in the proceedings as a "John Doe Complaint" and
was never filed or made of record. (R. 108-109) The bill
of particulars, ·with complaint attached, is set forth in
Schedule G of the appendices.
The deposition of the defendant taken bt:~fore Judge
Jones (Exhibit 2) was never offered to the defendant
for signature or correction and he never delivered the
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,ame to any one within the concept of Section 76-45-6,
i'tah Code Annotated, 1953. (R. 118)

The questions and answers contained in the indictrnPnt in some respects are taken out of context. Para~raph 3 of the bill of particulars states that all of the
~ulJject matter of the indictment "is material to the
charge set forth" in the "John Doe Complaint." Demands for a further bill of particulars were rejected
and a motion to quash the indictment was denied.
The indictment is silent as to the subject of inquiry
and gives no indication as to materiality. Judge Jones
inquired directly on the question of bribery, but the
indictment does not charge perjury in connection with
the negation of the same.

"Q.

ln relation to these leases, Mr. Brady did
anyone ever approach you and off er you any
sort of bribe in relation to them'

A.

No, Judge, nobody ever approached me on a
bribe." (Exhibit 2, p. 31, 1. 25-28, R. 154)

The preamble of the deposition states, in part:
"THE COURT: What we're doing, Mr. Brady
and Mr. Nielsen, is proceeding under Title 77 of
the Utah Code. It provides that * * * a John
Doe Complaint may be signed and* * *to proceed
with the depositions of other persons to see if
there is any gTolmds for having it actually issued,
* * *. First of all, there was Hugh Nielsen. The
second individual was Neuman Petty. We've also
had Boyd N erdin in, and this morning, rred Newsom was here.

4
* * *

Our principal area will involve the bit paver anrl
the history on both sides of it, plus ·what would
appear to be related facts. "' * *" (Exhibit 2
Pages 2-3, R. 127-128)
'
The trial judge permitted the jury to speculate not
only as to what was in the minds of the Grand .Juror~,
but also as to what ·was in the mind of Judge Jones, sa 111
testimony. (Instruction No. 6).
The leasing of the bit paver by the Salt Lake County
C01mnission during the month of September, 1963 and
other transactions will be pointed up in the argument
pertaining to our claim of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Evidence is Insufficient to Support the Ver·
diet of the Jury and the Motion for a Directed
Verdict of Not Guilty Should Have Been Granted.

It is contended that the quantitative evidence rule
precludes proof of falsity by circumstantial evidence
alone. The rule is stated in the annotation, 88 A.L.H. 2d
859, as follows:
"Thus, in a number of cases it has been expressly
held or stated that falsity of testimony alleged
to be perjurious must be established by direct owl
positive testimony of two witnesses or onr wit11es,,
and corrolJorating circumstances, and that circumstantial evidence alone is never sufficient."
(Emphasis added)
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See also Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 65 S.Ct.

o±S, 89 L.Ed. 495 ( 1945) ; United States v. Remington,
\91 F .2d 246, (2nd Cir., 1951) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907,
i~ S.Ct. 580, 9G L.Ed. 1325, and 41 Am. Jur., Perjury,
Sec. 67, Page 37.
We analyze the various issues as submitted to the
.iury by Instruction No. 6, in sequence and under headings as follows :
A. THE TESTING OF THE BIT PAVER

The questions and answers in this regard were as
follows:
"Q.

After you returned to Salt Lake, and before
you were informed that Midvale Motors had
purchased this machine, was the County testing this machine 7

A.

You bet, we were.

Q.

And were any reports submitted to you as
to the result of the tests 7

A.

Mr. N erdin contacted me quite frequently
and I went out to the scene quite frequently
to see the tests." (Exhibit 2, p. 15, 1. 17-24)

The indictment omits the italicized letter "I," which
was inserted by the trial judge. There is no evidence in
the record as to whether the defendant did or did not
go to the scene "quite frequently" or otherwise. The insertion of the word "I" is consistent, however, with the
nnsigned deposition of the defendant. The State did
not challenge the testimony that the defendant went to
the scene to see the tests nor did the State adduce any
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testimony to challenge the statement that ''Mr. Nerdin
contacted me quite frequently." The bill of particulars
concedes that the bit paver was tested:
"The testing consisted of two days only - on 11 1
about August 13, 19G3 and on or about Augu 8t
17, 1963."
This begs the question as to whether the testimony
as given by the defendant was false. The trial judg~
put words in the defendant's mouth that he did not utter
by Instruction No. 6, 2A, the preamble of which reads:

"That C. \V. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated by
Mr. Brady to lead Judge Jones to understand
that Salt Lake County tested the 'bit paver' befon: ,
leasing it substantially more exclusive than it
was in fact so tested * * *."
The Grand Jury by its indictment did not subscribe to the connotation of "extensive testing." It even
omitted the subject of inquiry in its indictment. It was
the District Attorney who authored the idea and the
trial judge elaborated by the words: "substantially more
* * * than it was in fact so tested." Regardless of the
rustortion of the defendant's testimony, there was no
evidence that the same was false, there was no showing
that the defendant rud not go to the scene of the tests,
and there was no showing that N erdin did not contact
the defendant. The evidence affirmativd.v shows that
tests were conducted while the machine was owned hy
Bonneville Equip1rn•nt Company. (R. 210) Tlw sale of the
bit paver to Midvale J\fotors was August 27, 1963. (R.
179) The letter from Hubert H. Nielsen, President of
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Bonneville Equipment Company dated August 24, 1963
1Exhibit 5) states in part as follows:
''In line with the results of the past 36 days relative to the performance of the Tanco Bit Paver,
this machine has concluded its' test pattern at
:1200 West by putting down a seal coat of 'Black
Beauty Slag' and US-2 Bitumen that is unequalled
in the State of Utah."

It is submitted that the evidence is insufficient to
support a verdict of guilty in connection with the questions and answers under subsection A of Instruction
No. 6 and that the motion for a directed verdict with
respect thereto (R. 297-300) should have been granted.
B. THE USE OF THE BIT PAVER UP TO
CHRISTMASTIME.

The questions and answers in this regard were as
follows:

"Q.

Are you aware of the fact that the machine
was not used at all during January and February and part of December~

A.

As I recall, the machine was used, and I think
we used it in the Chesterfield area, and I
think we used the machine right up until
Christmas.
* * *
Q. Do you remember Mr. Schemahorn back in
Indiana discussing the fact that they put their
machine away from Labor Day until May~
A.

No, I do not. We used this machine up until
December, I'm sure, right until Christmastime." (Exhibit 2, p. 21, 1. 6-22)
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The ·words "As I recall," "I think w0 used it in thi:
Chesterfield area," ''I think we used the machine rigltt
up until Christmastime," when fairly considered in connection with all of the testimony of the defendant, c1ualify,
explain and erode away the assertion "\Ve used thii
machine up until December, I'm sure, right until Chri~t
mastime."
The questions and answers are taken out of context when viewed in the light of the entire deposition.
Preceding the question first above, Mr. Brady was asked:

"Q.

A.

If l\fr. Nerdin's record that the machine was
used during September, October, November
and part of December, would you accept this
as being pretty accurate~

Yes, I would." (Exhibit 2, p. 20, 1. 24-27)

It is clear that Mr. Brady was not testifying of his
own knowledge as to the use of the bit paver. He made
it obvious to Judge Jones that l\Ir. Nerdin's record as
to the use of the machine would be the best evidence.
Judge Jones stated in his introductory comments in the
deposition that he had previously deposed N erdin.

The net effect of taking the testimony before Judge
Jones out of context is to give the impression that the
defendant was testifying as to his own knowledge. l\Ir.
Brady made it obvious to .Judge Jones that his recollection was subordinate to the record. Judge Jones, by
his question, implied that N erdin had a record showing
that the machine was used during "part of December."
There was no effort made on the part of the State to
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,how that the defendant did not honestly believe that
the machine had been used up until Christmastime.

'rhe elements of falsity, deliberation and willfulill'SS are all dissipated by the answer to the effect that
the witness would subscribe to whatever the record
~ho wed, as that question was put to him by Judge Jones.
Tlw annotation, G6 A.L.R. 2d 792 states in part:
"lt has in many instances been held, or stated
as a general proposition, that perjury cannot be
assigned upon a statement which is merely an
Pxpression of belief or opinion. Such holdings
and statements are subject, however, to the qualification that a charge of perjury or false swearing may be based on a statement under oath as,
or embodying, a matter of belief or opinion·
where such belief or opinion is not in fact held
or entertained."
The trial court in ruling upon the motion for a
directed verdict in this regard stated that "The testimony is circumstantial only that he knew it." (R. 299)
When the defendant was asked if he would accept N erdin's record "as being pretty accurate" and having answered in the affirmative, then the defendant's state of
mind became inconsequential. Under the quantitative
rule, however, the State had the burden to prove the
alleged falsity of the state of mind or opinion by more
than circumstantial evidence.

What Judge Jones meant by his reference to "Mr.
Nerdin's record" is not revealed. No record by that
name was produced. A bookkeeper, Joe Riccardi, prepared State's Exhibit 21, which was received in evidence
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over the objection of the defendant. (R. 237) The exhibit purports to be a summary made by the witness
from documents relating to materials used by the bit
paver. (R. 235) The exhibit was calculated to show suhstantially when the bit paver ·was last used in the calendar year 19G3. On voir dire, the witness revealed
that he did not have the basic documents in his possession and that they were last seen in the custody of thP
Grand Jury. (R. 23G) The court admitted the exhibii
over objection, but stated to the District Attorney "eventually I want you to produce" the documents. (R. 237)
The documents were never produced and as a consequence, cross-examination of the witness on the subject
was aborted. The same objection, the same rule and
the same voir dire questions apply to State's Exhibit 2~,
the summary of alleged daily reports of chips spread
for 1964. (R. 240) The base documents were never produced. Exhibit 20, purporting to be a summary of parts
purchased for repairs on the bit paver and of supplies
furnished was also received in evidence over objection,
with the court ordering basic documents to be produced,
which was never complied with. (R. 242)
The rule is well stated in :20 Am. Jur., Euirlcucr.
Section 449, Page 400:
"To render a summary of voluminous records
prepared by an (~xpert ~drnissible in evidence, the
competency of the reeords tl!Pmselves as evidence
must have beE'n establislwd and the records mnst
further be made available to the opposite party
for the purpose of cross-examination."
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'11 he witness Van Ausdal, testifying for the State,
i
!

!aid that operations with the bit paver in the Chesterrield area stopped "just before Thanksgiving" on acr·ount of mechanical difficulty. (R. 211) The State's witue~s 'l'hayne, who had the overall responsibility for the
, pt>rntion of the hit pawr (H. 222), testified that the
1rnrk in the Chesterfield area with the bit paver terminated around the 15th or the 20th of November, 1963
1R. 220); that the wheel on the machine broke and that
it was taken back to the shop approximately ten days
later. (R. 221) When asked who, besides himself, would
\Jave any knowledge of the fact that the machine had been
returned, he answered: "I don't know of anybody. T
don't recall telling anyone." (R. 227)
The uncertain testimony of the witnesses Van Ausdal and Thayne as to the cessation of work in the
Chesterfield area and the removal of the bit paver to
the county shops points up the prejudicial effect of
not having the advantage of the documents from which
Riccardi made his compilations. There can be no justifieation for the absence of the documents at the trial
of the case in light of the testimony that they had been
exhibited to the Grand Jury.
The answers to the questions under this subsection
of Instruction No. 6 cannot be tortured into the concept
of a willful, deliberate falsehood. The evidence is not
"ufficient to support the verdict and the motion for a
rlin~ch'd verdict in favor of the defendant should have
lwen granted. vVe submit that reasonable minds could
not differ.
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C. THE TAKING OF 'l'HI~ BIT PAVER TO THE
SHOPS IN .JANlTAl{Y FROM CHESTERFIELD.
The question and answer in this regard is as follows:

"Q.

Did 1\I r. N erdin ever inform you that thr.'
machine was sitting idle during Jan nary 1

A.

Oh, I lrnFw the machine was - as a matter
of fact, at that time we used it, like I say, up
until December, and the weather moved in,
and we was hoping to get the project completed in Chesterfield, and we left the machine in Chesterfield. And then ·we had to
take it from Chesterfield back out to the shop,
and this was sometime in January. We had
to get the machine out of there." (Exhibit 2,
p. 22, 1. 1-9)

Much that we have said with respect to the Subsection B above is applicable to this subsection. Both
the question and answer have their idiosyncrasies and
are taken out of context. For example, the question as
to whether Mr. N erdin informed J\f r. Brady that the
machine was sitting idle during January was not answered. Characteristic of many witnesses, Mr. Brady
volunteered that the machine had to be taken from Chesterfield back to the Shop because of weather conditions
even though they had hoped to get the project completed.
It is conceded by everyone that the machine remained idle at the County Shops from and including the
month of January 19G-± until June of that year when
a new lease was entered into, and all without any expense

I
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I to the County, except perhaps small repairs. The trial
\ court, however, in its preamble to the question and an! ower in this subsection (Instruction No. 6) stated:

"That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated
by l\Ir. Brady Jr. to lead Judge Jones to understand that the bit paver was not placed in the
Salt Lake County shop yard till substantially
later than it was in fact so placed * * *."
The materiality of whether the bit paver was returned to the shops in January because of weather or
otlwr conditions is centered around the concept of the
cancellable provisions of the lease of the machinery.
The lease (Exhibit 4) is dated September 25, 1963 and
is for a term of five consecutive months, commencing
on the 23rd day of August, 1963 and ending on the 22nd
day of Febriwry, 1964. The italicized portion, the date
of February 22, 1964 is an obvious error. Five consecutive months from the 23rd day of August, 1963 would
make the termination date the 23rd day of January, 1964.
The last rental payment of $4,000.00 was due on the
22nd day of December, 1963. The lease would have
had to have been cancelled prior to the 22nd day of December in order to save the last monthly payment.
The testimony is uncertain as to the precise date
\\'hen the machine broke down in the Chesterfield area,
hut it is clear from the testimony of both Thayne and
Van Ausdal that the lease could not have been cancelled
in time to save the $4,000.00 payment due November
22, 1963. Any fair eonsideration of all of the surrounding circumstances, including a possible "break" in the
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weather, permitting the renewed operation of the 11w
chine would lead to the conclusion that it would be unreasonable to have ex1wcted l\f r. Brady as tlw lwad of
the department, to have brought a11out the cancellation
of the lease to save the payment due December 23, 19G3.
Assuming the exactitude of prudent supervision and
being able to forecast the vagaries of weather dnring
the forepart of December, 19G:3 making the operation of
the machine impossible, and giving some reasonable
tolerance to arrive at the conclusion and to set in motion
the paperwork incident to cancellation, there is still
reasonable doubt that Mr. Brady could have cancelled
the lease to save the December payment. It is obvious,
however, that Judge Jones did not have the December
payment in mind when he quPri<"d tlw defendant. He
was misled in the belief that the lease could have been
cancelled in January to save the last month's payment.
During the deposition, Judge Jones asked Mr. Brady
the following:

"Q. Could you haw~ n•asonahly anticipated using
it during January and February?
A.

No, no, I don't think so. Not unless the
weather would have really been opened and
the temperature been up we may have been
able to use it.

Q.

Was there any reason then for not cancelling
the lease as provided in the lease?

A.

No, probably an ovPrnight was all." (Exhibit 2, p. 22, 1. 10-17)
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~l r. Brady was forthright in his response to Judge
,Jones and there was no evasion of the thrust of the
im1uiry. If the defendant had answered that Nerdin's
n·<·nrds were the best evidence instead of guessing at
thL· situation, as he obviously did, he would still have
i1•vpaled the possible oversight in not having cancelled
tiw lease. If the physical operations of the bit paver
had CL~ased prior to or on or about Thanksgivingtime,
the witness would still have revealed the oversight in
not having cancelled the lease.

'This rPnCTPl'S antielimactic as to whether the bit
pa,Ter was taken back to the shop at Christmastime or
in January and most certainly no fair minded man could
·my that there was a willful intent to deceive. There is
no evidence sufficient for the jury to the effect that
111'. Brady knew that the machine had been returned to
the shop, and particularly in light of the testimony of
the State's witness Thayne to the effect that he, as
the foreman, told no one of the incident.
Judge Jones in a question following within an interval of four questions clearly indicates his misinterpretation of the lease when he asked the witness:
"Q.

A.

Excuse me, Isn't it a fact that the bit paver
remained on the County or at the County
shops between the expiration of the first lease
which was in February, and the signing of
the second lease which was in June of 19641
It did, yes." (Exhibit 2, p. 22-23, 1. 29-3)

It is clear that there was no intent to deceive nor
was tltt> question or the answer material. Both Judge
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Jones and the trial court miscom;trued the lease, as the
last rental payment wm; dne on December 23, 1963 and
there ,,-as no further iia.y1m·nt due during the month of
.January, 19G-l- or February of t!tat year. Tht'l'(· 1xa:
no issue that eould prnpt·dy havv lw<·n suhmitt<•d to tli1·
jury premised upon thE~ question and answer in this snlJsection of Instrnction No. 6.
D. OTHER PROPERTY LEASED BY THE
COUNTY.
The question and answn in this regard is as followo:

"Q.

\Vhat other type of equipment have you leased
in the past for the county~ (Emphasis added)

A.

I think we leased a garbage packer or two of
them through the Purchm;ing Department. I
think we also and are presently lt>asing frorn
- well, you can check the name. It would
be in the records. Leasing some sweepers."
(Exhibit 2, p. 29, 1. 16-22)

The State contends that the perjury consists of the
fact that Mr. Brady did not reveal in answer to the
question propounded that Commissioner Jensen on May
15, 1963 had leased an Allis-Chalmers crawler tractor for
Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges from Motor Lease,
Inc. through Ted Newsom, manager, (Exhibit 18) and
thereafter on the 15th day of June, 1963 leased the same
tractor for Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges from
the same lessor for a period of two years, ending on the
14th day of June, 1965. (Exhibit 19) The first lease for
the period of one month was for the sum of $3,000.00,
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payablP in advance, and the second lease was for the
~urn of $3,000.00 per month for the first six months and
the remaining eighteen months at $1,880.00 per month.
:llr. Brady had nothing to do with either lease and so
far as the record is concerned, knew nothing about the
transactions.
'rl1e language ''what other type of equipment" exdudPs the type of equipment previously the subject of
im1uiry by Judge Jones, such as the bit paver and con~eivahly all heavy equipment. The question uses the word
"you" and excludes Commissioner Jensen and all other
individuals leasing or purchasing property for the county.

The question is inarticulate, ambiguous and misleading, particularly in light of the claim that the defendant
should have included the Allis-Chalmers tractor leased
by Commissioner .Jensen \vithin the response that was
lllade. 'l'he ::)tate stretches the imagination to the breaking
point when it contends that the responsive reply should
have included the heavy piece of etjuipment called the
Allis-Chalmers tractor, covered by a lease that the defendant neither krn='W about nor was connected with as a
participant.
The trial judge puts this strained construction on
the question and the answer by the preface to this portion of the instruction, which reads as follows:
''That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated by
.Mr. Brady to lead Judge Jones to understand
that no other lease of such equipment was in ef-
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feet -with, or through TPd K <:'\\-s0111 01· any cornpany represented b>- him when in fact ~ leasP
existed on an Alas-Chalmers tractor ~- * ''. ''
The trial court ignored the fact that the Allis-Chai
mers tractor was the subject of a leasp participated in by
Commissioner Jensen for Salt Lake County, and the
fact that there was no lease of that particular equipment
that the defendant ,,-as a part.\- to ..Judge Jones was inquiring concerning tlw direct and personal activities of
the defendant with reference to the subject matter. This
is made crystal clear by the qm·stions and answers immediately preceding the question and answer, the subject of the instruction.

"Q.

As the Commissioner in charge of Bridges
and Roads for the County, have you in thP
past had an occasion to negotiate several
leases?

A. Oh, yes.
Q.

:B'or special equipment such as a bit paver,
specialized equipment such as a bit paver1

A.

No. I think that's the only piece of specialized
equipment that I ever leased." (Exhibit 2,
p. 29, 1. 8-17)

There is nothing in the deposition taken before Judge
Jones or in the indictment or in the bill of particulars
that refers to an Allis-Chalmers tractor. There was no
formal charge> a11prising the ddenclant of the naturr
of the charge against him so far as the subject of in·
quiry was concerned, and in particular, the lease of the
Allis-Chalmers tractor.
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To comvound the error, State's Exhibit No. 15 was
a!httitkd owr the objeetion of the defendant during the
, :\arnination or Cornrnissimwr .h•nsen and read in part to
th(' jury. (R. 270-271) The exhibit purports to be a reproduction of a document, not sig1wd by, for, or on behalf
of Salt Lake County. rrhe document is dated the 17th day
of ~I ay, 196-± and covers the same Allis-Chahners tractor
a~ described in Exhibit 18.
'rhe obvious purvose of the State Attorney was to
(·rPak the impression before the jury that the defendant

had in fact leased the Allis-Chalmers equipment on behalf of the County from Motor Lease, Inc. This erroneous impression, with the aid of the trial court, and over
objection, was to the prejudice of the defendant. Exhibit 15 was inadmissible on its face. It is an unsigned
rq1l'oduction of an instrument concerning which no foundation was laid as to the whereabouts of the original
document or that either the original or the exhibit itself
t'Ver had any vitality as a commitment binding upon
Salt Lake County. Defendant's struggle to keep out the
obvious]>- inflammatory and prejudicial exhibit and the
conversations with respect thereto was futile. (R. 265270) On cross-examination, Commissioner Jensen admitted that Exhibit 15 was not presented to him by Mr.
Brady; that it was presented by Mr. Borg, the purchasing
agent (R. 275) ; that Exhibit 15 was never executed by
Salt Lake County; that it never became a lease; that it
JH•wr had any vitality as a contractual document; that it
dot's not mean anything except a piece of paper so far
, a~ a contractual commitment is concerned. (R. 276)
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Commissioner Jensen conceded Exhibit 18 to be a
lease for the same e<1uipment; that it was executed by
him as Commissioner in charge of the Purchasing Department; that it did not go through the Commission and
that it was not submitted to him by .l\lr. Brady. Commissioner Jensen did not recall whether the lease, Exhibit
18, was presented to him by the purchasing agent, .Mr.
Borg, or by l\ir. N e'.vsoui. Then, on cross-examination,
stated that he (Jensen) did not say anything to Mr. ,
Brady about the lease dated the 15th day of May, 1963.
(R. 277)

By way of summary, the closest that the State got in
its efforts to prove perjury in connection with the AllisChalmers equipment was that Mr. Brady had somewhat
of a caustic conversation with Commissioner Jensen over
a proposed lease submitted by someone other than Mr.
Brady, probably the purchasing agent, and which lease
was never consummated. The lease of the Allis-Chalmers
equipment was negotiated and consummated by Commissioner Jensen and there is nothing in the record to
show that Brady had any knowledge of the transaction,
Commissioner Jensen did not advise Mr. Brady, and the
minutes of the County Commission do not reveal the
transaction. It must be assumed, therefore, that :Mr.
Brady did not know of the leasing of the equipment, and
most certainly, the proof does not square up with Judge
Jones' question: "vVhat other type of equipment have
yoii leased in the past for the county~" The motion for a
directed verdict in this n·spect should have been granted.
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II. Other Prejudicial Evidence Admitted During the
Trial Over the Objection of Appellant.
1. DURING THE TESTlMONY OF JUDGE
,JON 1£S.

Jndge Jones identified State's Exhibit No. 1 as a
ear hon copy of the so-called "John Doe" complaint signed
before him by Delmar L. Larson on the 22nd day of
;\pril, 1965. The witness did not know where the ribbon
copy of the document was and stated that he did not believe it was given a file number. The carbon copy, along
11ith the original copy, was left by the witness in the
County Attorney's office and not afterwards seen by
him. (R. 108-109) ·when the Exhibit was offered, there
was an objection made, and the following occurred:

"Q.

(By l\fr. Banks) I will show you a file in
this case. Attached to one of the Defendant's
pleadings is a photo copy marked Exhibit B.
I will ask you if you can identify what that
purports to be.
* * *

A.

This appears to be a photo of the amended
John Dor complaint, which this is a copy of.

MR. GUSTIN: I move to strike that term
"amen de d John Doe Complaint" on the
ground that it is an improper conclusion by
this witness.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The
jury may make such, I think they will be able
to understand ·what the situation is. I trust
the common sense of the jury on this matter."
(R. 109-110)
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Throughout the trial, the trial judge left matters
of law on objections as to relevancy, materiality and competency to "the common sense of the jury". In this instance, however, the above reference by Mr. Banks was
to a photocopy marked Exhibit B "attached to Defendant's Objections to Bill of Particulars as Furnished an<l
Request for a Supplemental Bill of Particulars." (R. 21)
The Exhibit B, so attached, was <~xhibited to the witness
and he then characterized it as "a photo of the amended
John Doe complaint, * '~ *". The handwritten additions
and deletions a]Jpearing on Exhibit B are in the handwriting of Judge Jones (R. 110) and were made after
the 7th day of May, 1965, the time of the deposition of the
defendant Brady and after the 22nd day of April, 1965,
the date that Delmar L. Larson signed Exhibit 1.
Judge Jones characteriZ":ed his scribblings as being
the "amended complaint". The document with the handwritten scribblings was never filed and while the witness
deleted the names John Doe, Jam es Doe and Richard Doe,
and substituted the name of Theodore M. Newsom, the
implication that the document was an "amended complaint" as affecting Mr. Brady, or anyone other than
Newsom, is clearly erroneous. The trial jury was not
shown Exhibit B referred to as being attached to one of
the defendant's pleadings, so that it did not have even
an inkling as to the true facts of the situation, merely
the conclusion of J uclge .Jones that the "John Doe" complaint had been amended. The motion to strike the term
"amended John Doe Complaint" on the ground that it
was an improper conclusion by the witness should obvi-
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onsly have been granted. The prejudicial effect in not
the motion is obvious. The trial court, however,
was not content with rnerely denying the motion, but
added:
~ranting

"'The jury may make such, and I think they will
be able to understand >vhat the situation is. I trust
the common sense of the jury on this matter.:'
(R 110)

A rather thorny legal problem was thus delegated to
the jury. Furthermore, a community of interest between
the trial court and the jury was established and peculiarly
~olidified when l~xhibit No. 1, after having been read to
the jury by the District Attorney, was ordered handed to
the jury by the court with the comment:

"Hand it to the jurors so they can pass it among
themselves to see the general nature of the instrument. You may continue." (R. 111-112)
Exhibit No. 1 purports to charge "the attempted
hrihery of an ext'cutive officer." It had no probative
value so far as the instant action is concerned and it was
infla11m1ator)'. lts onl>· purpose was to establish the right,
if any, on the part of Judge Jones to depose Mr. Brady.
This was a legal problem and not one for the jury.
->

~11JNS

DURINO THE rrES'l1IMONY OF THE WITNIELSEN.

Nielsen was identified with Bonneville Equipment
, Company, the concern that sold the bit paver to Motor
Lease, the company with which Ted Newsom was identifiPd. Tht' defrndant in his deposition taken before Judge
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Jones acknowledged having lea8ed the bit paver from
Motor Lease. The lease>, Exhibit -!, signed by Commissioner Cannon on behalf of Salt Lake County, was the
end point of the lease negotiatimrn. Nielsen, however, was
asked several quc>stions as to conversations with Boyd
N erdin, the Superintendent of Hoads and Bridges, and
with Newsom, all out of the presence of defendant Brady.
The objection to each of the qnc>stions on the grounds of
hearsay was overruled and ('ach answer by the witnes~
resulted in infla111111atory and eollatPral rnattern. By \\'ay
of example, Nielsen was asked:

"Q. Did you negotiate with anyone from Salt
Lake County with reference to the purchase
of this machine." (R. 161)

Over objection as to materiality and as being beyond
the issues in this case (the District Attorney knew that
there were no negotiations for the purchase of this machine) the witness stated that he contacted Boyd Nerdin,
Superintendent of Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges.
The witness was thrn asked concerning a conversation
with N erdin, which ·was objected to as being hearsay and
·which was ovPnnled on the stated ground:
"Res gestae, business trairnaction. He may answPr
as to this. The hearsay rule does not have application, continue." (R 161)
The answer was that the witness asked if he, Nerdin,
would talk to Mr. Brady "about getting some interest in
the machine, to purchase it". ( R. 163) A subsequent conversation with N erdin developed the answer:
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"A.

l\Ir. Nerdin said that he had talked with Mr.
Brady about it, but he said that he says there
is another man that is closer to Mr. Brady
than anybody, whom I suggest that you talk
to." (R. 164)

On a motion to t:>trike, which was overruled, the court
stated:

"I believe the jury can handle this type of testimony, continue."
'J1he witness then testified:
"A.

\Vdl, he said, 'I suggest that you talk to him,
Ted Newsom appeared in court, he said 'I
think he might be able to help you on this
type of thing.' He is Mr. Brady's gubernatorial campaign manager and handled his affairs on anything that might reflect upon
him." (R. 164-165)

'rhe motion to strike the answer of the witness on
the ground that it was inflammatory, prejudicial, hearsay
and immaterial was denied and the trial court made the
gratuitous but ambiguous statement:
"I believe that it is a matter for the jury as to
whether or not this is part of the way the business
was done, or whether it was not, and whether it
occurred, or whether it didn't occur, is immaterial
for the jury to decide." (R. 165)
Counsel for the State did not ask in good faith coneeming a transaction with reference to the "purchase"
of the bit paver, but was interested only in getting before the jury by innuendo and hearsay that the defendant
had suggested that Nielsen do business with a third
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party and the alleged political ambitions of Brady to run
for governor and identifying Ted N e\vsom as his alleged
campaign manager. This was not only the rankest kind
of hearsay and over-tlte-foneP g-o:-;sip, \\'ith nothing at all
to do with any business transadion, but prejudicial.
The error was compounded in still another objection
which vrns overruled when the court passed on to the
jury the responsibility of determining a legal point and
then refused to admonish the jury that hearsay was not
offered "for the truthfulness of it", the words used by
the District Attorney. (R. 166)
An unjustified statement of the trial court was made
in the presence of the jury after overruling a motion to
strike certain of the hearsay testimony of the witness
Nielsen by the gratutious statement:
"I believe it is an insult to the jury to quibble into
this matter." (R. 163)
The rapport between thr trial court and the jury had
already been established beyond the normal course of
things, as pointed out in connection \Vi th the "John Doe"
complaint. The belittling or downgrading of counsel by
the trial judge could not have had other than a detrimental effect. The motion to strike was addressed to the
court and involved a legal point. The jury was in no way
involved and the so-called connotation of "insult" was a
problem for the trial court and not the jury.
3. DURING rrIIE r11EsrrDfONY OF r:J'HE WIT

NESS RUSSELL.
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J olm K. Russell was an accountant for Motor Lease
and a previous employee of Petty Ford Company. (R.
205) The witness was asked to give the name of the
majority stockholder of Midvale Motors. The question
1rns objected to on the ground that it was immaterial
and irrelevant. The trial court in overruling the objection
made the gratutious statement:
"Answer the question and the jury will decide
what is relevant in this matter." (R. 206)
-1-. DCIUNU THJ£ TESTIMONY OF THE \VIT-

:rnss

JENSI~N.

The objection made to the testimony of the witness
.Jensen with respect to Exhibit No. 15 which never ripened into a commitment on the part of Salt Lake County
IR 2G5) and the assignment of misconduct on the part of
the District Attorney (R. 267-269) is somewhat unique.
Prior to trial, an order had been entered permitting the
defendant a limited inspection of testimony given before
the Grand Jury by the witness Jensen and others. (R.
:50-32) Thus the defendant was alerted to certain matters occurring before the Grand Jury that had no compet<mcy, relevancy, materiality or probative value upon
the trial of the issues in the instant case. This included
the reference to Exhibit No. 15 and to the purported conVPrsations elicited from the witness Jensen with the defendant. (R. 267-269) Counsel for the State, in adhereing to the modus operandi pursued before the Grand
.Jm:-·, was peenliarl~. vnhwrnble in so doing to the charge
of bad faith when the evidence so adduced at the trial
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accomplished no more than to inflame the petit jury on
extraneous matters to the prejudice of the defendant. The
proceedings before the Grand Jury lose much of their
glamour when vie\\-ed in the cold light of day and in this
instance, the District Attorney ·was warned in advance
that the testimony attempted to be elicited by Commissioner J ensm \rnuld be challenged on the grounds indicated, as well as counsel's good faith.
Commissioner Jensen did not testify to any relevant
fact material to the issues herein involved. He was the
one that negotiated the lease of the Allis-Chalmers tractor and not the def end ant. Commissioner Jens en did not
advise the defendant of the lease nor did he make it of
record at any Commission meeting. The only purpose of
his testimony was an ulterior one, that of getting before
the jury, to the prejudice of the defendant, a purported
conversation with reference to a proposed lease (Exhibit 15) that was never consummated.
5. SU1LMARY OF RULINGS ON EVIDENCE.

The trial court, and to even a greater extent, the
District Attorney, was aware of the inflammatory nature
of collateral matters. ·while certain latitude is undoubtedly permissible to determine the materiality of the answers
of witnesses in support of the charge of 1st degree perjury, nevertheless, a definite area of judicial circumspection was involved in order to insulate against erroneous
impressions and erroneous conclusions. The hearsay in·
jected into the record and indicated by the trial court as
being a "part of the way the business was done", or
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"just a verbal fad and business transaction", or the "res
~l'stae" or "shop hook rule" was admissible, if at all, for
a limited pmpose. \Ve submit that none of these rules
apply. The conversations carried with them no business
implication, but merely inflammatory collateral matters.

JiJven in those instances where the exception to the
hearsay rule is applicable, it is pointed out with uniformity that the admissibility of evidence for a limited purpmw involves ''certain risks'' in that the trier of fact
might consider the evidence in relation to issues for which
it would be inadmissible. In State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497,
9± P. 987 (1908), the Court states:
"In State v. Thorn1Json, 31 Utah 228, 87 Pac. 709,
l\I r. Justice Straup, speaking for the court, says:
'\Vhere evidence is received in a case which is admissible only for a certain purpose, and is inadmissible for other purposes to which the jury unaided may improperly apply it, it is essential that
the court should correctly instruct them as to the
purpose for which they may consider the evidence'."

Wigmore on Evidence, Volume 1, Section 14, Page
303 (3rd Edition) states:

wrhe time for determining the admissibility of n.
}Jarticular fact is ordinarily the time when it is
offered to the Coitrt."
It will be recalled that the trial court refused to
forthwith instruct the jury that the truthfulness of the
NPwsoru statement to the witness Nielsen was not an
issue in light of the District Attorney's express statement in that regard. (R. 166)
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The statements attributable to the defendant by Commissioner Jensen could not i10ssibly come within the
holding of this court in State v. Neal, 123 Utah 93, 254
P.2d 1053 (1953) where the testimony of the bus driver
that the defendant threatened him, saying: "Keep moving. I just shot a man." was held admissible as an admission against interest, citing Wignwre on Evidence, 3rd
Edition, Section 10 and Sections 1048 and 1049. With
Commissioner Jensen's statement, however, the claim is
made that the testimony was elicited in bad faith because
the District Attorney, in his contact with the Grand Jury
knew that the defendant had not leased the Allis-Chalmers tractor.
The other facet of the Neal case in its reference to
Wigmore on Evidence is under the rule of res gestae,
which clearly is not appEcable here. As pointed out above,
the conversations with the third parties were not in
connection with any extemporaneous or even remote
overt act chargeable to the defendant within the issues of
the case.
Justice Wolfe in Sfote v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d
1016 (1947) comments on the hearsay rule, as follows:
"But in the common law there were developed certain exceptions to that basic rule, for example,
the hearsay rule, which made certain evidence,
though relevant and material, incompetent. That
was because of the danger of prejudice to the
party against whom it ·was offered who would
have no chance to cross-examine the source, or the
probative value of the evidence offered was small
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as compared to the great prejudicial affect it
might have."
Yimved in light of the hearsay testimony as having
little, if any, probative value, it became incumbent upon
the trial judge to determine whether the same might be
misused by the triers of fact and to apply the rule credited to Justice Cardozo in Shepard v. United States, 290
U.S. 96, 54 S.Gt. 22, 78 L.Ed.196 (1933), that:
"-When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset
the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out."
The practicalities of attempting to have a jury of
la)·rnen screen from the evidence that which is relevant

from that which is not is pointed up by Justice Cardozo
in Shepard v. United States, supra, by the following:
"Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the
compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating
clang of those accusatory words would drown all
weaker sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not
for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are
framed. They have their source very often in
considerations of administrative convenience, of
practical expediency, and not in rules of logic.
vVhen the risk of confusion is so great as to upset
the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out."
In K rnlewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct.
ilG, 93 L.Ed. 790 (19±9) the hearsay statement of a co('Onspirntor ,,·as held inadmissible because made after the
objectives of the conspiracy either had failed or had been
achieved. The statement was not admissible having been
rnadP in furtht'rance of an alleged implied, but uncharged,
eonspiracy aimed at preventing detection and punish-
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ment. The importance of this decision in the instant case
is the holding to the eff eet that error is presumed if "the
Court is left in grave doubt as to whether the error had
substantial influence in bringing about a verdict." And,
the language of .Mr. Justice ,Jackson in his concurring
opinion is equally important:
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can
be ove1·come by instructions to the jury ·· "' "", all
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
The rule was recently restated in Taylor v. Baltimore & Ohio lfoilroacl Co., 3±± F.2d 281 (2nd Cir., 1965):
"The basis for an inference of intimidation is extremely weak as against the danger that if the
statement is admitted, the jury will use it substantively regardless of what the judge may say. See
. McCormick, supra S 39, at 77. 'When the risk of
confusion is so great as to upset the balance of
advantage, the evidence goe;:,; out.' "

III. Instructions and Requested Instructions.
Instruction No. 2 (R. 63-66) purports to instruct as
to the "allegations of the indictment." This instruction
is set forth in full in the appendices as Schedule D. There
is nothing in the instruction exct'pt for the quoted qni:stions and answers that is even remotely connected with
the indictment. The instruction is centered around matters alleged to have occurred on or about the 2.'Jr,d day of
Aitgust in 1963, which date is taken from the "John Doe"
Complaint signed by Delmar Larson on April 22, 1965.
The instruction quotes the charging part thereof includ-
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ing ''the atte1111ited bribing of an executive officer". The
instruction attributes to the indictment evidentiary detail
including the mentioning of the Allis-Chalmers tractor,
concerning which both the indictment and the bill of particulars are silent
The instruction credits the indictment as saying that
Mr. Brady's answer omitting reference to the AllisJChalmers tractor "could logically lead Judge Jones to believt> l\f r. Newsom had no other lease with the County to
lw enquired into, and that belief could logically mislead
Judge Jones in his taking of testimony and in acting on
Delmar Larson's allegations". There are other distortions
of both the indictment and the testimony within the four
corners of Instruction No. 2.
The exception to Instruction No. 2 was upon the
ground that the instruction does not set forth what the
indictment charges, and in other respects it constitutes
an "editorialization" on the indictment. (R 304) The trial
judge not only improperly commented on the evidence
and drew conclusions with respect thereto, but am.ended
and supplemented the indictment. It was for the Grand
Jury to articulate the charge. The indictment cannot be
changed, amended or rewritten except by the grace of
1-lc'ction 77-21--rn, l'tah Code Annotated, 1953.
In State v. Myers, 5 Utah 365, 302 P.2d 276 (1956),
the statute just mentioned was held not to be applicable
to matters of substance. The court stated:
"As was stated by this court in the case of State
v. Pettit, (97 Utah 443, 93 P.2d 675)
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'The code of criminal procedure is not designed to eliminate essential averments
or to permit the pleading of misleading
factual data, whether or not it was done
knowingly.'
The court in that case eonstrued 105-21-43, U.C.A.
1943 (now 77-21-4-3, supra), to apply to variance,
defects, or omissions that pertain to matters of
form only rather than matters of substance."
The last paragraph of Instruction No. 15 (R. 80) was
objected to on the ground of prejudicial comment on the
defendant's conduct. (R. 306) Of interest is the fact that
the District Attorney took exception to the same portion
of the Instruction (R. 301-302) as being an unwarranted
comment on the entire conduct of the accused. He has not
testified. The last paragraph of Instruction No. 15, after
being interlined by the trial court reads :
"Corroborative evidence may be circumstantial as
well as direct and the entire conduct of the accused
himself, both as a witness in his own behalf before
a City Judge, and at times other than at the trial,
as shown by the evidence, may be looked to for
corroborative circumstances." (Emphasis added)
The portion of the instruction objected to not only
had the effect of emasculating the quantitative rule reilating to proof of perjury, but it also was an unwarranted and entirely improper invitation to speculate on
matters that were not and could not conceivably have
been of record. The word "conduct" connotes something
different than the words spoken before Judge Jones. The
words "as a witness in his own behalf" clearly imply that
he was the accused before Judge Jones. Take this conno-
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tat ion and. apply it to Exhibit 1, the "John Doe" complaint, and to Instruetion No. 2, which re-emphasizes "the
attempted bribery of an executive officer", we have a
,,ituation the equivalent of saying to the jury that the defendant stood before Judge ,Jones accused of bribery. To
this is added, tlw "L:omlnet'' of tlw accused "at times other
than at the trial". This could conceivably mean the outward expressions of the defendant to newspaper report<·rs in the corridor of the courtroom. The speculation
in thi;,; regard is not saved by the expression "as shown
by the evidence". There is no evidence in the record as to
the ''conduct" of the defendant, in or out of court. The
defendant did not testify in the instant case, and the suggestion as to his conduct "as a witness in his own behalf", with or without the interlineation "before a City
.Judge" is but an oblique adverse comment by the trial
judge of the fact that he did not take the witness stand.
The prejudice is apparent.
Instruction No. 1-1 (R. 79) is inconsistent with the
first paragraph of Instruction No. 15 (R. 80) and the
second paragraph of Instruction No. 16 (R. 81) and was
1•xcepkd to on the ground of such inconsistencies. (R
305) Other exceptions to instructions were taken, as well
as exceptions to requests made and not given and to requests given as modified, but these matters in the light
of the PlTOr specifically pointed out above are but cumulative. Instruction No. 6, however, merits specific reference: on the ground that it is confusing and incomprehensible and the exception to that effect.
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Requested Instruction No. 2 (H. 47), which was refused, should, under all of the circumstances of the case,
have been given, particularly in light of the literary license indulged by the trial court in its instruction of the
same number. The request reads as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury, as a matter of law,
that the indictment in this case is no evidence, in
the slightest degree, but is a mere formal charge,
requiring proof of all of the material allegations
contained therein, by the testimony of witnesses,
or by facts and circumstances. And you are further instructed that the law presumes the defendant to be innocent of the crime charged in the
indictment, until he has been proven to be guilty
beyond all reasonable doubt; and this presumption of innocence i;:; no mere idle theory, to be cast
aside by the jury through mere caprice, passion
or prejudice, but it is a substantial part of the
law of the land, and follows the defendant
throughout the entirC' case, and must not be lost
sight of by the jury until it has been overcome by
evidence which «stablishes the defendant's guilt
beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty."
In lieu of the foregoing, the court gave its Instruction No. 3, which reads:
"You are instructed that the foregoing instruction is not to be regarded as a statement of facts
proved in this case. But is to be considered merely
as a summarized state>ment of the accusation
against the defendant." (R. 66)
Requested Instruction No. 3 (R. 48) on the quantitative proof required incident to a perjury charge was refused. This request should lw compared with the first
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.11«> paragravhs of lnstnwtion No. 15 (R. 80) which in-

'! 1w t io:1 was r~ilntP(l lir·:, Oilfl eorni;n·L<·nsion by the refer-

io ddendant's conduct ns more particularly stated
allOw. r:l'he requested instruction reads:
l'JlCP

"You are inst meted that the State must establish
to your safo.;faction heyond a reasonable doubt
the falsity of the defendant's sworn statements by
direct and po~;itiw evidence. Direct and positive
Pvidence is evidence of one or more witnesses who
have actual knmYledg·e of the facts corroborated
b~.r othC'l' independent circumstantial evidence.
Should the State fail to sustain its burden in these
imrticulars to your satisfaction beyond a reasonabk~ doubt, then you cannot convict the defendant
and he must be acquitted."

IV. The Deposition Taken Before Judge Jones
ShouM Have Been Suppressed.
Defendant's motion to supress (R. 33-34) was overruled and denied (R. 35) and was based upon grounds
(1) the same grounds as urged in connection with the
motion to quash the indictment; ( 2) the "John Doe"
~ornplaint did not eharge a public offense, was never filed
in the City Court, was rendered nugatory and made abortive by Judge Jones, and all proceedings thereunder were
extrnjudicial; ( 3) the complaint as s1vorn to by Delmar
L. Larson did not eurnply with subparagraph 1 of Section
17-11-1, l 'toh Code A1111,Jtatc.d, 1953; and ( 4) the purported deposition was never subscribed to by the defendant, nor was he penni tted to correct the same, nor was
it ddivercd to an:;, iwrson by him -vvith the intent that it
he uttered or published as true.
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As to the subparagraph 1 of 8ection 77-11-1, it is
mandatory that the complaint name the person accused,
if known, "or if not known and it is so stated" he may be
designated by another name. Delmar L. Larson did not
under oath in the so-called "J olm Doe" complaint state
that the true name of a defendant was not known. The
lack of such an allegation goes to the question of good
faith at the grass roots of the entire proceeding.
The bill of particulars states that Judge Jones "acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in
said complaint" (John Doe Complaint) and proceeded to
interrogate the defendant herein under the provisions
of Section 77-11-3, Utah Co,de Annotated, 1953, which
Section reads :
"When a complaint is made before a magistrate
charging a person with the commission of a crime
or public offense, such magistrate must examine
the complainant, under oath, as to his knowledge
of the commission of the offense charged, and he
may also examine any other persons and may
take their depositions."
The bill of particulars states that the interrogation,
in question and answer form, was reported by a certified
shorthand reporter and notary public and was reduced
to writing. Mr. Brady did not sign or correct the so-called
deposition, nor was it ever delivered by him to any
person with the intent that it be uttered or published as
true, as contemplated by Section 76-45-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads:
"The making of a deposition or certificate is deemed to be complete, within the provisions of thi~
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C'ha1it<·r, frolll tlw time ·when it is delivered by the
acrn:wcl to ::u1>- other person with the intent that
it l1e uttered or published as true."
H(•dion 71--+-+-'.2, r-tu!1 Cod. An11doted, 1953, makes
tliP rules of evidence in civil actions applicable to criminal actions, exce11t as otherwise provided in the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Proccditrc, is to the effect that when the testimony is
fully transcribed, the deposition shall be submitted to
the witness for examination, shall be read to or by him,
and that he may make such corrections or changes upon
the deposition, in form or in substance, as he desires.
0

If perjury is to be based on what occurred before
Judge Jones, it should be bottomed upon a deposition
subscribed to by the defendant in the manner recognized
hy rule and not otherwise. The indictment was fatally
defective in this regard and in any event, the purported
tleposition not so signed, subscribed, uttered and delivered should have been suppressed.

V. The indictmeni is Fatally Defective.
The motion to quash (R 23-24) which was denied by
the trial court (R 27) is referred to here on the ground
that tlw indictment does not charge the defendant with
tlw commission of an offense, in that it does not inform
of the nature and cause of the accusation and with re:-111ect to which there must be an identification of some
i:.;sue or inquiry or subject matter in terms of which an
initial judgment can lw made regarding the possible mat<'riality of the all<•gt>dly false testimony recited in the
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indictment. These matters were carefully considered by
the court in State v. Popolos, 103 A.2d 511 (Maine, 1954),
where the court, among other things, stated:
"A respondent, or a court, cannot judge the reasonable possibility of the materiality of the testimony unless the indictment, on its face, identifip~
some specific issue, or subject matter, in relation
to which the question of materiality is raised. * * ~
'The purpose is to allow for the formulation or
identification of some issue, or inquiry, or subject
matter in terms of which an initial judgment can
be made regarding the possible materiality of the
allegedly false testimony recited in the indictment.
It is to enable the Court, by inspection of the indictment alone, to conclude whether the testimony
set forth and claimed to be false can have any
reasonable possibility of materiality. If the indictment on its face does not sufficiently identify the
particular proceeding to which it is claimed the
materiality of the alleged testimony relates, defendant is deprived of a most imp o rt ant
right***."
The court cites State v. Webber, 78 Vt. 463, 62 A.
1018, as a leading case "and one squarely in point". The
Vermont case had to do with a streamlined statutory
form of indictment in perjury cases, and held the indictment to be fatally defective because neither count specified the subject matter of the investigation then being
pursued by the Grand Jury.
The court, in Popolos, supra, then concludes:

"It is thus elear that an indictnH'nt for iwrjury
even under a streamlined statutory form, must
contain some designation or identification of the
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particular matter l;eing investigated, or heard, by
the trihunal involved. Such identification is entirely lacking in the present indictment. The prosecutor has done no more than to show, in the
most generic terms possible, that the Grand Jury
was acting on a multitude of matters within its
jurisdiction. In no manner has he undertaken to
inform the respondent of any particularized or
identifiable subject matter, within that general
jurisdiction, by which the respondent or the court
can evaluate, initially, the possibilty of the materiality of respondent's allegedly false testimony,
or to give him information to prepare his defense.
Neither can we comprehend how a respondent
could plead former jeopardy under such a general
allegation."
The Colorado case of Treece v. People, 40 P.2d 233
(193-t) is cited in State v. Popolos, supra. Objections were
made at the beginning of the trial to the introduction of
any testimony, and to the testimony of each witness. A
motion for a directed verdict was made. The motion and
all ohjectiom; IH".·e overruled by the trial court. The objections were made on the ground that the indictment was
insnfficient to charge perjury in that it did not allege
the subject or matter of the inquiry before the Grand
.Jury at the time the defendant gave the alleged false
testimony. The appellate court, in reversing, held that
th<' objections were to matters of substance and not of
form and therefore could be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.

In People v. Greenwell, 5 Utah 112, 13 P. 89 (1887),
the indictment stated the fact claimed to be material to
thP matter under investigation. In State v. Anderson, 35
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Utah 496, 101 P. 385 (1909), the complaint before the
magistrate set forth with a fair degree of particularity
the issue of materiality. The Popolos case, supra, carrie~
this requirement into the present day streamlined mode
of pleading.
The District Attorney, by his bill of particulars,
has stated that all of the matters set forth in the indictment are not claimed to be false, and then he presumes to suggest the area of the allrged falsity, a mattl'r
peculiarly within the province of the Grand Jury.
Whether the District Attorney can presume to reflect
the deliberations of the Grand Jury by the bill of particulars, he cannot, in any event, enlarge upon the indictment or aid or assist the court in the determination
of what may or may not be material. It was held in
State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 117 P.2d 455 (1941) that
the offense must be charged in the indictment or information without reference to the bill of particulars and
that if the information is indefinite as to the offense
charged, the bill of particulars is of no help in deciding
questions of the relevency of evidence.
There is no criteria, no yardstick, for the trial judge
to follow in the inevitable instruction to the jury or determination as a matter of law the problem of what is
or is not mat(~rial and therefore, the motion to quash
should have been granted on that ground alone.

CONCLUSION
Perjury when in fact committed is a most reprehensible crime. More reprehensible, however, is the low-
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of judicial standards as a matter of expediency.
ln this case, it was considered expedient by someone to
bring about the political demise of an individual. That
11·as accomplished. It remains for this court to apply
tiim' honored rules and the unquestioned sern;e of justice
and fair play to a situation in which the accumulation
of enor is overwhelming. When the proceedings before
J urlge .Jones are considered in their full context, every
rms\vcr attributed to the defendant by the indictment
will not support the charge of which he stands convicted.
This court should reverse and dismiss the action.
Pl'ing

Respectfully submitted,
Harley W. Gustin
GUSTIN & R:i;CHARDS
Attorneys for Appellant

APPENDICES
SCHEDULE A

(<CAPTION OF COURT AND CAUSE OMIT'TED)
INDICTMENT
The Grand Jurors of the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, accuse C. W. BRADY, JR. of the crime of
PERJURY IN THE FIRST DEGREE, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 45, Section 7, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as follows, to-wit:
That on or about the 7th day of May, 1965 at
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the said
C. W. BRADY, Jr. committed Perjury in the
First Degree by falsely testifying before the Honorable Maurice D. Jones, Judge of the City Court
of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, after having
been duly sworn upon oath to tell the truth to
the following material facts :
Q. "Did l\fr. Newsom inform you of the time of
departure and when you were going to leave~ Did
he have anything to do with the arrangements
for the trip?

A.

I don't think so, no."

"Did you ever discuss this with Mr. Newsom
prior to his submitting the lease to the County
that was eventually signed?
Q.

A. "Never did I ever discuss the machine with
anybody."
"After you returned to Salt Lake, and before
you were informed that Midvale Motors had pu~
chased this machine, was the County testing tlns
machine?

J Q.
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A.

A.

You bet, we were.

Q. And were any n~ports submitted to you as
to the result of the tests 1
A. ~fr. N erdin contacted me quite frequently,
and >vent out to the scene quite frequently to see
the tests.

::J

Q. "Do you remember whether or not it was used
during September of 19631
A.

No, I would not know.

Q. Do you know whether it was used during October of 19631
A. No. You'd have to go back to the records on
that.
Q. Do you know whether it was used during November of 19631
A. No but I'm sure the records we'd have would
show whether it was or was not.

JQ

B.

"Are you aware of the fact that the machine
was not used at all during January and February
and part of December 1
A. As I recall, the machine was used, and I think
we used it in the Chesterfield area, and I think
we used the machine right up until Christmas.
Q. Do you know that it sat in the lot down there
not being used through January and February1
A. No, I didn't know this."
Q. "Do you remember Mr. Schemahorn back in
Tndiana discussing the fact that they put their
machine away from Labor Day until May1
A. No, I do not. We used this machine up until
December, I'm sure, right until Christmastime.'.:..!
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fQ.

''Did Mr. N erdin ever inform you that the
machine was sitting idle during January.

C.

A. Oh, I knew the machine was - as a matter
of fact, at that time we used it, like I say, up until
December, and the weather moved in, and we was
hoping to get the project completed in Chesterfield, and we left the machine in Chesterfield.
And then we had to take it from Chesterfield back
out to the shop, and this was sometime in J rurnary. We had to get the machine out of there.:J

fQ.
D.

"What other type of equipment have you
leased in the past for the County~
A. I think we leased a garbage packer or two of
them through the Purchasing Department. I think
we also and are presently leasing from - well,
you can check the name. It would be in the records. Leasing some sweepers.:.J

contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the State
aforesaid, in such cases made and provided, and against
the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
A true bill
Russell C. Bendixen
FOREMAN OF THE GRAND JURY
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
SCHEDULE B
INSTRUCTION NO. 6

No. 6
Before you can convict the defendant, C. W. Brady,
Jr. of perjury in the first degree you must find each of
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!he following elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. That C. \V. Brady, .Jr. was sworn to tell the
truth before a Salt Lake City Judge on or
about 7 'Thfay 1965 in Salt Lake County.
By "sworn" the court means to take an
oath and promise to speak honestly and completely concerning the truth as he believed
it to be.

2. That while under said above-oath G. 'lv. Brady
Jr. intentionally and wilfully testified in words
in substance being inconsistent with fact as follows:
A.

That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated by Mr. Brady to lead Judge
Jones to understand that Salt Lake
County tested the "bit paver" before
leasing it substantially more exclusive
than it was in fa.ct so tested and that at
least part of such representation was in
substance as follows :
"Question: After you returned to Salt
Lake, and before you were informed
that Midvale Motors had purchased this
machine, was the County testing this
machine~

Answer : You bet, we were.
Question: And were any reports submitted to you as to the result of the
tests~

Answer: Mr. N erdin contacted me quite
frequently, and I went out to the scene
quite frequently to see the tests."
and/or
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B.

That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated by Mr. Brady to lead Judge
Jones to understand that the "bit paver"
was used much later in the year of 1963
than was the fact, and that at least part.
of such representation was in substance
as follows:
"Question: Are you aware of the fact
that the machine was not used at all
during January and February and part
of December?
Answer : As I recall, the machine was
used, and I think we used it in the Chesterfield area, and I think we used the
machine right up until Christmas."

****

"Question : Do you remember .Mr.
Schemahorn back in Indiana discussing
the fact that they put their machine
away from Labor Day until May1
Answer : No, I do not. We used this
machine up until December, I'm sure,
right until Christmastime."
And/or
C.

That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated by Mr. Brady Jr. to lead Judge
Jones to understand that the bit paver
was not placed in the Salt Lake County
shop yard till substantially later than
it was in fact so placed and that at least
in part such representation was in substance as follows :
"Question: Did Mr. N erdin ever inform
you that the machine was sitting idle
during January 7
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"Ansvver: Oh, I knew the machine was
- as a matter of fact, at that time we
used it, like I say, up until December,
and the weather moved in, and we was
hoping to get the project completed in
Chesterfield, and we left the machine
in Chesterfield. And then we had to
take it from Chesterfield back out to
the shop, and this was sometime in
January. We had to get the machine
out of there."
And/or
D.

That C. \V. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated by Mr. Brady to lead Judge
Jones to understand that no other lease
of such equipment was in effect with
or through Ted Newsom or any company represented by him when in fact
a lease existed on an Alas-Chalmers
tractor and that at least in part such
representation was in substance as follows:
"Question: What other type of equipment have you leased in the past for
the county~
Answer: I think we leased a garbage
packer or two of them through the Purchasing Department. I think we also
and are presently leasing from - well,
you can check the name. It would be
in the records. Leasing some sweepers."

It must be recognized that the State must prove
onlv one of the above alleged false statements, but may

prove more than one.
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That at the time C. W. Brady Jr. spoke the words
proven as in two above, if any, C. W. Brady Jr. was
conscious that he was representing contrary to fact. A
mere honest mistake or misunderstanding, no matter how :
serious, is not perjury but perjury may come about if
one consciously and wilfully
A.

States as a fact that which is not true, or

B.

States he has knowledge or a belief when he
knows he does not enjoy that state of mind,
and knows it, or
C. States he does not have knowledge or a belief ,
when he knows he, in fact, had such knowledge
or belief, or
D. Or a combination of ABC, or AB, or BC, etc.
When the information charges in the same count
that the defendant made more than one perjured statement, the proof need show that he made only one of
such statements to support a conviction provided that
as to that one statement the proof is adequate under
the law and shows that every essential element of the
crime of perjury, as I have defined those elements, was
present in the making of such statement.
3. That the falsehood was material in the proceeding.
An essential element of the crime of perjury in the
first degree is that the matter falsely sworn to be true
be material to a valid issue in the proceeding, in or for
which the statement is made. If it is not thus material
the making of the statement however false or reprehensible, is not perjury in the first degree.

1
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But the matter sworn to, need not be directly and
i111111<'diately material; and if not the requirement of the
law as to materiality is met if the false statement is so
('Onnrckd with a fact \\'hich is directly in issue as to
have a natural tendency to prove or disprove such a
fart either by itself bearing circumstantially on the question, or by giving weight to or directing from any other
evidence on the issue. In short, the test of materiality is
whether or not the statement could have properly influPnced the tribunal upon the question at issue before it.
The alleged issue at the time of the alleged oath
was given is alleged to be: Judge Jones' judicial determination of how to act on Delmar Larson's allegation
that is set out in the exhibit ------·
If you find elements one, two, and three proven

beyond a reasonable doubt it is your duty to convict
the defendant of perjury in the first degree. If you find
elements one, two, so proven but not element three then
it is your duty to convict of only second degree perjury,
that is a lesser included offense and occurs when all
elements of perjury in the first degree are present except
the third above. If you do not find element one and two
proven beyond a reasonable doubt you must acquit C.
W. Brady Jr. the defendant.
SCHEDULE C
BILL OF PARTICULARS
(CAPTION OF CO (TR'r AND CA USE OMITTED)
In answer to defendant's Request for Bill of Particulars, plaintiff submits the following:
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1. A complaint entitled the State of Utah vs. Joh;n
Doe, Jane Doe and Richard Doe, a copy of which is
attached hereto and marked Exhibit "A", was duly issued
by the Honorable Maurice D. Jones, a duly elected and
qualified Judge of the City Court of Salt Lake ·City,
State of Utah, on the 22nd day of April 1965, after the
complainant, Delmar L. Larson personally appeared before said Judge and after being duly sworn upon oath
attested to the truthfulness of the allegations therein contained where the defendants \Vere charged with the crime
of Accessory to the crime of Attempting to Bribe Executive Officer in violation of Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 45,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. The Court thereby acquired
Jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in said
complaint and proceeded under Title 77, Chapter 11,
Section 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953 to bring before
the Court the defendant C. W. Brady, Jr. and after
placing him under oath proceeded to interrogate him in
open court in question and answer form, the same being
reported by Ned E. Greenig, ·Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
the same being reduced to writing, the District Attorney,
Jay E. Banks, a duplicate original copy of same, and
said matters being material to the allegations in said
complaint, and after examining said defendant, C. W.
Brady, Jr., and others with reference thereto, the said
Maurice D. Jones, Judge of the City Court of Salt Lake
City, State of Utah, as such on the 12th day of May 1965,
issued Salt Lake City complaint No. 42895 entitled State
of Utah vs. Clarence William Brady, Jr. a/k/a C. W.

1

~
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Buck Brady, Jr., charging said defendant with Making a
Profit Out of or Mi::msing Public Funds; Salt Lake City
~ase No. 42896 entitled State of Utah vs. Clarence Willimn Brady, Jr., a/k/a C. \V. Buck Brady, Jr. charging
~aid defendant with Asking for or Receiving a Bribe
as an Executive Officer of Salt Lake County; and Salt
Lake City case No. 42897 entitled State of Utah vs.
Theodore M. Newsom and charging said defendant with
Brihing an Executive Officer, said complaints arising out
of the John Doe complaints heretofore referred to. That
all of said complaints heretofore ref erred to were duly
issued by the said City Judge Maurice D. Jones, after
being duly sworn to by Delmar L. Larson as complaining
witness.
2. All of the alleged testimony contained in the Inuictment is not claimed to be false.
3. All of the subject matter of the Indictment is
material to the charge set forth in the copy of the attached
complaint.
4. That portion of the Indictment relating to Newsom's not making arrangements for the trip is false. The
portion of the Indictment relating to the defendant's
never discussing the bit paver with Newsom prior to his
~ubmitting the lease to the County is false. [!he portion
of the transcript as to extensive testing of the bit paver
is false. The testing consisted of two days only - on

B.
C.

D.

or about August 13, 1963 and on or about August 17,
196!) (!hat portion of the testimony of using the bit
paver up to Christmastime is false J ~nd J it was taken
~k to the ~hops in January _fromChe_sterfield is fals~
!2-1hat portion of the transcript r~rmg to other equipment leased by the County is fals.:j
JAY E. BANKS, District Attorney
Third Judicial District
Salt Lake County, Utah

I !\HIBIT
A
\TTACHED TO
I BILL OF PARTICULARS
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In the City Court
OF SALT LAKE CITY

r

Before

I

lVI. D. JONES

Judge of the City Court
Bail $

1500.00 each

·-····································-··--

Judge.

'

I

THE STATE OF UTAH
vs.
11HN DOE, JANE DOE and

I . ..
~'!CHARD

·:o-o-E········································

=

COMPLAINT

-;;~;~~~:.~;

On this 22nd day of April, A.D. 1965, before me, M. D. JONES,
uuge of the City Court within and for Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
mnty, State of Utah, personally appeared Delmar L. Larson, who,
1 being sworn by me on his oath, did say that John Doe, Jane Doe
iu Richard Doe on or about the 23rd day of August, A.D. 1963, at
de County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, did commit the crime of
ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 1, Sec' lion 45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as follows, to-wit:
(
That the said John Doe, Jane Doe and Richard Doe, at the
time and place aforesaid, having full knowledge that a felony
had been committed, to-wit: the attempted bribery of an
executive officer, in violation of 76-1-30 and 76-28-3, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, did conceal same from a magistrate;
1
'ntrary to the provisions_ of the Stat~te of the State afor_esa!d, in
·uth cases made and provided, and agamst the peace and dignity of
1

I
I

,
I

I
r·

st,te of Utah.

SUbiC:.~dzn:L;:~~~~;O~~~.

the day and year first above written.
M. D. JONES
City Judge

SCHEDULED
Instruction No. 2
You are instructed that allegations of the indictment
are as follows :
That the witness Jones is a city Judge of Salt Lake
City. That on or about the 7th day of May 1965 Judge
Jones was acting as a judge and had be.fore him for
consideration an allegation by a person named Delmar
L. Larson, who swore that one had attempted to bribe
an Executive Officer in violation of Utah Statute; and
that other persons were accessory to such an offense in
that they had knowledge of the felony but had concealed
it, or secreted it; the allegation was that the conduct
had occurred on or about the 23rd day of August in
1963, that Delmar Larson was alleging

I
!

"That the said John Doe, Jane Doe and Richard
Doe, at the time and place aforesaid, having full
knowledge that a felony had been committed, towit: the attempted bribery of an executive officer,
in violation of 76-1-30 and 76-28-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, did conceal same from a magistrate"
That Judge Jones was attempting to search out information to make a judicial determination of whether or not .
he as Judge should or should not issue process and what I
form, if any, it should take, if issued.
'That Judge Jones, pursuant to this indeavor, did I
request the defendant, C. W. Brady, Jr. to take an oath ,
to answer truthfully concerning the matter under inquiry.
That Mr. Brady consented and was duly sworn and ques-

t'
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i
i

lioned, and made answers. The indictment alleges that
~Ir. Hrnd~, in violation of this oath committed perjury
in tl1at he intentionally, and wilfully and contrary to law
gave untrue answers with an intent to mislead Judge
Jones when such might lead or encourage Judge Jones
into not acting correctly in the matter. So far as this
proceeding before you jurors here today, the prosecution relies on the following particular allegations as perjury:

1. That Mr. Brady was asked the following queslions and Mr. Brady gave the following answers with an
intention of misleading Judge Jones into understanding
the bit paver had undergone materially more extensive
testing in Salt Lake County than was the fact, whereas
', it had been tested only on two days before the county
leased the machine:
"Question: After you returned to Salt Lake, and
heforp you were informed that Midvale Motors
had purchased this machine, was the county testing this machine~
Answer : You bet, we were.
Question: And were any reports submitted to you
as to the result of the tests~
Answer: l\Ir. Nerdin contacted me quite frequently, and went out to the scene quite frequently to see the tests."
And it is alleged that l\fr. Brady's testimony above taken
in context and as intended, was a perjurous attempt to
mislead Judge Jones in that he might believe the method
u:scd by Salt Lake County in leasing the machines was
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contrary to what was the fact; and might reasonably i
affect Judge Jones' action if the matter of the gener~l '
allegations made by Delmar Larson.
2 . That Mr. Brady was asked concerning when the
"bit paver" was last used in 1963 in the following question and made the following answer with intent to mislead
Judge Jones into understanding that the "bit paver"
was used much later in the year than was true, thereby
possibly leading Judge Jones into understanding the contract lease was more favorable to Salt Lake County than
true and the failure to cancel the lease more favorable
in that the season of its use more nearly matched the
contract period than was true and such statements might
reasonably have misguided .Judge Jones in his detennin·
ation as to how to act on Delmar Larson's allegations
"Question : Are you aware of the fact that
the machine was not used at all during January
and February and part of December~
Answer : As I recall, the machine was used, and
I think we used it in the Chesterfield area, and
I think we used the machine right up until
Christmas.
Question: Do you remember Mr. Schemahorn
back in Indiana discussing the fact that they put
their machine away from Labor Day until May?
Answer: No, I do not. We used this machine
up until December, I'm sure, right until Christmastime."

,

I

:
.

I

!
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hit pavn \\'as rn·ver used aftl'r ~ovem
l)('r ~II a11d ::\fr. Brad~· km·\\- that hl·, :.\Ir. Brady \\HS not
i11fo1·u1Pd affin11ativPly of its use in DPcernlwr.
\\ lwn i11 f'ad tit(•

:3.

it ii'i here charged that for the same purpose
n~ of :2 ahove Mr. Bra<ly was questioned concerning the
urn('hine's use and place in January of 1964. On questioning hP made an answer intentionally calculated to misIP<Hl .Judge Jones in that he stated he affirmatively
krn·w tlw bit paver was not returned to the shops till
Jnanuary 196-! which statement l\Ir. Brady made knowing
it \ms not the state of his information in that he knew
hl· did 11ot know when it was returned or knew it was
rdnrrn'll in an earlier month, in question and answer as
follows:
~\l:-;o

"Question: Did l\Ir. N erdin ever inform you that
tlw machine was sitting idle during January~
Answer: Oh, I knew the machine was - as a
matter of fact, at that time we used it, like I say,
up until December, and the weather moved in, and
\H' was hoping to get the project completed in
Ch<>stcrfil'ld, and we left the machine in Chesterfi<'ld. And then \Ve had to take it from Chesterfield back out to the shop, and this was sometime
in January. We had to get the machine out of
th<> re."
±. 'rha t Judge Jones asked concerning other leased
11iaehi1wry but 1\Ir. Brady's answer thereto was perjurous
a)](l ealculated by Mr. Brady to omit reference to an
"\las-Cliahners tractor leased through l\Ir. Newsom, the
~Hllll' person who pffected the "bit paver" lease; said
a11~w1•r purporting to refer to all such leases and said

tiO

answer could logically lead Judge Jones to believe Mr.
Newsom had no other lease with the county to be enquired
into, and that belief could logically mislead Judge Jones
in his taking of testimony and in acting on Delmar
Larson's allegations.
Question: What other type of equipment
you leased in the past for the county?

hav~

Answer: I think we leased a garbage packer or
two of them through the purchasing department.
I think we also and are presently leasing from well, you can check the name. It would be in the
records. Leasing some sweepers."
To these allegations the defendant has plead not guilty,
in effect denying that they are true.

No effort has been made to correct, as to spelling,
punctuation, or graniaitical errors appearing 'in arny of
the above schedules, as reprod-uced from the originals
of the respective documents.

NOTE:

